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CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW: 
PROTECTIONISM OR A GREAT  
LEAP FORWARD? 
Britton Davis* 
Abstract: Thirty years since China’s markets opened to the world, the Peo-
ple’s Republic has seen impressive growth, in large part due to an openness 
to foreign investment. In 2009, China was one of few nations to experience 
GDP growth. With a market based on competition for the first time in dec-
ades, China has begun to promulgate antitrust legislation to curb anticom-
petitive behavior. The creation of an Anti-Monopoly Law in 2008 has 
prompted concern from outside China that the law will be used to promote 
a protectionist agenda, shielding Chinese domestic industry from foreign 
competition or investment. This Note examines the root cause of such con-
cerns using a recent decision by Chinese antitrust authorities to prevent a 
merger between a domestic Chinese fruit juice company and Coca-Cola. 
This Note recommends an implementation of merger guidelines by the 
Chinese government in order to provide more transparency in its antitrust 
regime. 
Consumers associate happiness with our brand. In fact, Coca-Cola means 
“Delicious Happiness” in Mandarin. 
—2008 Coca-Cola Annual Report1 
Introduction 
 The Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) of the People’s Republic of China 
was promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress on August 30, 2007 and went into effect on August 1, 2008. 
The AML was enacted for the express purpose of “preventing and re-
straining monopolistic conducts, protecting fair competition in the 
market, enhancing economic efficiency, safeguarding the interests of 
consumers and social public interest, [and] promoting the healthy de-
                                                                                                                      
* Britton D. Davis is a Staff Member for the Boston College International & Comparative 
Law Review. He would like to thank Professor David Olson for his guidance, as well as Ben 
Wastler, Jay Swergold, Courtney Campbell, Paul Wagoner, Raghav Kohli, and Jenny Shum 
for their editorial assistance with this Note. 
1 Coca-Cola Company 2008 Annual Review 50 (2009), http://www.thecoca-cola 
company.com/investors/pdfs/2008_annual_review/2008_annual_review.pdf. 
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velopment of the socialist market economy.”2 To date, unresolved ques-
tions persist regarding which of these lofty goals will be most served by 
the AML and what approach China intends to take regarding antitrust 
issues.3 Whether China will use the AML as a tool to promote a protec-
tionist agenda, potentially harming global competition, is of significant 
concern.4 Considering that China is one of the few nations in 2009 to 
experience economic growth and is a fertile market for global corpo-
rate expansion, a shift by China to a more protectionist stand regarding 
foreign investment in domestic Chinese industries is undesirable for 
global economic stability.5 Such concerns are reinforced by stated goals 
of the AML focusing on safeguarding consumer and social public in-
terests, as well as the opaque decision-making to date by Chinese anti-
trust enforcement agencies.6 
 While many legal scholars contend that China is likely to approach 
its antitrust regime in a manner similar to the United States or the Eu-
ropean Union, China is faced with the considerable challenge of being 
a new player in the global marketplace, breaking out of its centrally-
planned, state-run system, while balancing concerns over unemploy-
ment, weathering the global financial crisis and stimulating domestic 
Chinese industries.7 The precarious global financial situation and a fo-
cus by Chinese policymakers on stimulus and stabilization will un-
doubtedly influence Chinese antitrust practice.8 The knowledge that 
China is one of the few successful markets in a global recession and an 
attractive marketplace for global corporations will likewise have a sig-
                                                                                                                      
2 Anti-Monopoly Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), arts. 1, 57, translated at http://www.china.org.cn/ 
government/laws/2009-02/10/content_17254169.htm [hereinafter Anti-Monopoly Law]. 
3 See Nathan Bush, Oracle Bones: Limited Lessons from China’s Merger Rulings, 8 Antitrust 
Source 1, 1 (2009), http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/09/08/Aug09-Bush8-12f.pdf. 
4 See id. at 5. 
5 See id. at 4; Elaine Kurtenbach, China’s 3Q Growth Accelerates to 8.9 Percent Pace, ABC 
News, Oct. 22, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=8886475 (last visited 
Apr. 17, 2010). 
6 See Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 2, art. 1; Bush, supra note 3, at 4–5. 
7 See generally Mark Blodgett et al., Foreign Direct Investment, Trade and China’s Competition 
Laws, 37 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 201, 201–03 (2009); Nathan Bush, The PRC Antimonopoly 
Law: Unanswered Questions and Challenges Ahead, 7 Antitrust Source 1, 2 (2007), http:// 
www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/07/10/Oct07-Bush10-18f.pdf; Yin Zhou, Note, China’s 
Anti-Monopoly Law: Insights from U.S. and EU Precedents on Abuse of Dominance and IP Exemp-
tion Provisions, 32 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 711, 716 (2009). 
8 See Bush, Oracle Bones, supra note 3, at 1. 
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nificant impact on how the Chinese balance the interests of stability for 
domestic enterprises and continued growth from foreign investment.9 
 Part I of this Note provides a brief glimpse into the merger review 
process under the AML through the lens of the blocked Coca-Cola/ 
Huiyuan Fruit Juice Company merger (Coca-Cola merger), along with 
an explanation of the state of the fruit juice industry in China. This sec-
tion also details some of the concerns stemming from China’s decision 
to block the Coca-Cola merger. Part II lays out the legal framework for 
the creation and implementation of the AML, focusing on the merger 
review process under the new regime, as well as an explanation of the 
merger review process in the United States for the purpose of compari-
son. Part III analyzes the role protectionism, concerns regarding public 
interests, and the advancement of a socialist economy play in merger 
review under the AML. This section analyzes the potential underlying 
rationale for the decision to block the Coca-Cola merger and how Chi-
na can improve on its merger review process through the adoption of 
clear merger guidelines for enforcement agencies. In addition, the 
need for improvement in transparency with merger analysis and deci-
sions will be addressed. Part IV concludes with an explanation of why 
the adoption of merger review guidelines and greater transparency for 
China will diminish concerns about economic protectionism and will 
provide guidance to foreign firms who may be considering a merger or 
acquisition with a domestic Chinese enterprise in the future. 
I. Background 
 On September 3, 2008, nearly one month after the AML went into 
effect in China, Coca-Cola announced plans to acquire the Huiyuan 
Fruit Juice Company (Huiyuan), a deal reportedly worth $2.3 billion.10 
This announcement came one week prior to the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers Holdings, Inc., the first dramatic event signaling a global eco-
nomic crisis.11 Huiyuan is China’s largest juice maker and controls 42% 
of the pure fruit juice market in China.12 Immediately following the an-
nouncement of the proposed merger, the Chinese public expressed con-
                                                                                                                      
9 See generally Blodgett, supra note 7, at 201–03 (discussing how “the drive for both for-
eign direct investment and foreign trade . . . occup[ies] a unique position[] of impor-
tance”). 
10 Bush, supra note 3, at 8. 
11 See Sara Behunek, Lehman’s Collapse: A Timeline, Deal, Sept. 15, 2009, http://www. 
thedeal.com/dealscape/2009/09/lehman_collapse_a_time_line.php. 
12 Tu Lei, Minute Maid Trying to Unseat Uni-President, China Daily, Feb. 23, 2009, 
http://chinadaily.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2009-02/23/content_7502227.htm. 
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cern over a foreign brand potentially acquiring a highly successful pri-
vate domestic enterprise such as Huiyuan.13 According to an online poll, 
more than 80% of over 76,000 Chinese polled were against the pro-
posed merger.14 Though Coca-Cola is one of the most popular brands in 
China, holding about 50% of the carbonated beverage market inside 
the nation,15 Huiyuan holds a particularly special place in the hearts of 
the Chinese people who view it as a success story, as a domestic brand 
successfully competing with international rivals.16 
 It is not surprising that Coca-Cola would pursue a larger presence 
in China, where growth has helped Coca-Cola counter the economic 
slowdown it has experienced in the United States, with 15% growth in 
the third quarter of 200917 and 19% overall volume growth in China in 
2008, which Coca-Cola credits to aggressive advertising during the 
Summer Olympics in Beijing.18 Coca-Cola introduced Minute Maid 
Pulpy™ to China in 2008 and grew case volume for the Minute Maid 
brand by 40% in one year.19 It is also not surprising that Coca-Cola 
would look at Huiyuan as a potential acquisition, as it would enable Co-
ca-Cola to take a major leap in the growing fruit juice market in Chi-
na.20 While Coca-Cola already held an estimated 12% of the market 
share in the total fruit juice market in China, due to the success of its 
Minute Maid low juice concentrate brand, it had yet to break into the 
pure juice market, where the Huiyuan acquisition would have immedi-
ately yielded it a near 40% share of the market.21 Fruit juices are highly 
popular in China among younger consumers, who are typically willing 
to pay more for what they perceive to be healthy products.22 Coca-Cola 
had been experiencing declining market share across all beverage 
brands to competitors that produce juices and teas, rather than exclu-
                                                                                                                      
13 See Coke Offer for Huiyuan Triggers Widespread Worry in China, China Daily, Sept. 4, 
2008 [hereinafter Widespread Worry], http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-09/04/ 
content_6999559.htm. 
14 Id. 
15 Ding Qingfen, Coca-Cola on a Rosy Perch in China as Sales Soar, China Daily, July 23, 
2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2009-07/23/content_8963285.htm. 
16 Widespread Worry, supra note 13. 
17 Martinne Geller, Coca-Cola Sales Miss; Shares Slip, Reuters, Oct. 20, 2009, http:// 
www.reuters.com/article/hotStocksNews/idUSTRE59J2EN20091020. 
18 See Coca-Cola Company 2008 Annual Review, supra note 1, at 8, 28. 
19 Id. at 24. 
20 Coca-Cola Bid Rejected by Chinese Government, InvestorGuide.com, Mar. 28, 2009, http:// 
www.investorguide.com/031809/Coca-Cola-Bid-Rejected-by-Chinese-Government.html. 
21 See id. 
22 Shaun Rein, What Coca-Cola Did Wrong, and Right, in China, Forbes, Mar. 24, 2009, 
http://www.forbes.com/2009/03/24/coca-cola-china-leadership-citizenship-huiyuan.html. 
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sively colas.23 Perhaps surprisingly, Sprite, a Coca-Cola brand, has be-
come more popular in China than Coke itself, as it is perceived by con-
sumers to be healthier than dark colas.24 
 In fact, research shows that China, when compared to the rest of 
the world, has a much lower per capita fruit juice consumption—one-
tenth the overall average level and one-fortieth that of developed na-
tions.25 Furthermore, foreign companies such as Coca-Cola have yet to 
tap into the third- and fourth-tier cities inside China, where much of 
the predicted growth in the fruit juice market is likely to come.26 Acqui-
sition of a domestic brand, such as Huiyuan, which has already begun 
to penetrate these less-developed markets, having an estimated 800 mil-
lion potential consumers, makes perfect sense for Coca-Cola to in-
crease its share of the Chinese fruit juice market.27 
 Unfortunately for Coca-Cola, on March 18, 2009, the Chinese gov-
ernment put up a roadblock to the company’s hopes of entering the 
pure fruit juice market through its acquisition of Huiyuan, using the 
AML to block the transaction.28 The Ministry of Commerce (MOF-
COM) posited a theory of competitive harm based on the theory of 
leveraging, finding that Coca-Cola’s dominance in the carbonated bev-
erage market would allow Coca-Cola to carry over that dominance into 
the fruit juice market, thereby eliminating or restricting competition 
and harming consumers.29 Additionally, MOFCOM feared that Coca-
Cola would have greater market power in the fruit juice beverage mar-
ket after acquisition because it would then control both its Minute 
Maid low fruit juice brand and the pure fruit juice brand Huiyuan.30 
MOFCOM also expressed concerns that the acquisition would squeeze 
out small- and medium-sized domestic enterprises, stifling innovation 
in the fruit juice industry.31 The Chinese government’s desire to pro-
tect small- and medium-sized domestic enterprises stems from the fact 
that many domestic industries are segmented, with production evenly 
distributed geographically across China, a holdover from decades of a 
                                                                                                                      
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 See generally Res. and Mkts., China Fruit Juice Industry Report, 2006–2007 (2007), 
http://www.researchandmarkets.com/reports/c56301. 
26 Rein, supra note 22. 
27 Id. 
28 Bush, supra note 3, at 8. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
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centrally-planned economy that favored local self-sufficiency.32 By con-
trast, Huiyuan is one of the only domestic fruit juice enterprises to suc-
cessfully compete against international rivals, leading many scholars to 
believe MOFCOM’s decision to block the Coca-Cola merger was rooted 
in economic nationalism or protectionism.33 
 China’s shift from a demand market economy, controlled and 
planned by the State, to an open market with limited competition be-
gan in 1978 under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping.34 Prior to Deng 
Xiaoping’s reforms, competition, much less a formal competition pol-
icy, was non-existent, with state-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominating 
almost all aspects of China’s economy.35 These SOEs coordinated pro-
duction according to directives from the government, with no input on 
pricing or output and no concern regarding profits.36 Prior to 1978, 
China lacked not just any legal structure regarding competition, but 
lacked a culture focused on competition at all.37 
 From 1978 until 1992, China allowed limited market competition; 
accordingly, the laws surrounding competition were limited in number 
and in scope.38 It was not until 1992, at the Fourteenth Meeting of the 
Chinese Communist Party, that a call for the establishment of a socialist 
market economy and a need for strong antitrust legislation emerged.39 
Through the 1990s, China enacted legislation aimed at protecting 
competition and consumers, such as the Law Against Unfair Competi-
tion, the Consumer Rights and Interests Protection Law, the Price Law 
and the Decision on Rectifying and Regulating Market Economic Or-
der, among several others.40 It would be sixteen years after China 
moved to an open market system that it would begin heavily legislating 
in the antitrust arena. 
                                                                                                                      
32 See Richard Student, China’s New Anti-Monopoly Law: Addressing Foreign Competitors and 
Commentators, 17 Minn. J. Int’l L. 503, 505 (2008). 
33 See Bush, supra note 3, at 9. 
34 R. Hewitt Pate, What I Heard in the Great Hall of the People—Realistic Expectations of Chi-
nese Antitrust, 75 Antitrust L.J. 195, 197 (2008). 
35 See Salil K. Mehra & Meng Yanbei, Against Antitrust Functionalism: Reconsidering Chi-
na’s Antimonopoly Law, 49 Va. J. Int’l L. 379, 386 (2009). 
36 See id. at 387. 
37 Id. at 390. 
38 Zhenguo Wu, Perspectives on the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law, 75 Antitrust L.J. 73, 74 
(2008). 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 74–75. 
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II. Discussion 
A. From a Closed Market to the Anti-Monopoly Law in Thirty Short Years 
 Although serious antitrust reform began in 1994, when the former 
State Economic and Trade Commission began drafting anti-monopoly 
legislation, the AML would not be finalized for thirteen years—the long-
est drafting period of any legislation in modern Chinese history.41 
Throughout the drafting process China continued to promulgate rules 
and regulations concerning competition in various forms, such as the 
Interim Provisions on Preventing the Acts of Price Monopoly in 2003.42 
This legislation was followed by the Provision on Mergers and Acquisi-
tions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (Provisions) in 2006.43 
 The Provisions laid out guidelines for foreign investments in domes-
tic Chinese enterprises, whether these investments involved the acquisi-
tion of a significant share of stock or wholesale acquisition of a Chinese 
enterprise.44 After the implementation of the AML in 2008, MOFCOM 
updated these Provisions, adding an article stating that foreign invest-
ment would follow the declaration requirements mandated by the AML, 
unifying previous guidelines still technically in effect with the AML.45 
 MOFCOM, the administrative body tasked with drafting the AML, 
consulted with foreign competition officials including the U.S. De-
partment of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, the American Bar 
Association, the World Bank, and the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development, among others.46 The drafting of the AML was 
conducted with greater transparency than many previous Chinese legis-
lative efforts; engagement by Chinese officials with the international 
community was seen as a victory for global competition, as the final 
                                                                                                                      
41 See id. at 76. 
42 See generally Interim Provisions on Preventing the Acts of Price Monopoly (promul-
gated by the State Dev. and Reform Comm., July 18, 2003, effective Nov. 1, 2003), translated 
at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/ipoptaopm625. 
43 See generally Provision on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by For-
eign Investors (promulgated by MOFCOM, State-Owned Assets Supervision and Admin. 
Comm’n of the State Council, the State Admin. of Tax’n, the State Admin. for Indus. and 
Com., Secs. Reg. Comm’n of China, State Admin. of Foreign Exch., Aug. 8, 2008, effective 
Sept. 8, 2008), translated at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/potmocsasaacotscts 
ottsafiacsrcocatsaofeomaaodebfi20063704. 
44 See id. 
45 See Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign In-
vestors (promulgated by MOFCOM, July 22, 2009, effective July 22, 2009), art. 51, translated 
at http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/law_en_info.jsp?docid=108906. 
46 Thomas Howell et al., China’s New Anti-Monopoly Law: A Perspective from the United 
States, 18 Pac. Rim L. & Pol’y J. 53, 56 (2009). 
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draft eliminated many of the provisions included in previous versions of 
the law and that concerned foreign observers.47 What remains to be 
seen is how the Chinese government will interpret the AML and which 
of the lofty goals expressed in Article I will most influence the decisions 
made with regard to antitrust concerns, particularly merger and acqui-
sitions review under Chapter IV.48 
B. AML in Action: Decisions to Date 
 Because only eighteen months have elapsed since the implementa-
tion of the AML, and the global financial crisis has slowed mergers and 
acquisitions, the body of AML-related decisions remains small; conse-
quently, there is still much uncertainty regarding what goals the Chi-
nese government is pursuing.49 The Antimonopoly Bureau of MOF-
COM has the responsibility of managing the review of mergers, or 
“concentrations,” under the AML. Having been the administrative body 
to conduct such reviews under the Provision that preceded the AML, 
the Antimonopoly Bureau has been revised to create a unified ap-
proach to merger review alongside the AML.50 MOFCOM is also re-
sponsible for issuing guidelines and special notification thresholds that 
guide when a potential concentration requires review under the AML 
for alleged anticompetitive effects.51 While these substantive guidelines 
have certainly enhanced the reliability of the new merger review 
scheme, there are still many uncertainties regarding how merger review 
is conducted by MOFCOM; moreover, provisions in the AML provide 
significant flexibility to MOFCOM in its decision-making, while provid-
ing virtually no notice to would-be merging parties of how a transaction 
might be analyzed by MOFCOM.52 
 A remarkable feature of the merger review under the AML has 
been the lack of transparency in analyses conducted by MOFCOM, 
which to date has published only five decisions and unconditionally 
cleared approximately forty deals with no public record of the analysis 
conducted in those decisions at all.53 Of the five decisions that have 
                                                                                                                      
47 See Bush, supra note 7, at 1–2. 
48 See Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 2, arts. 1, 20–31; Bush, supra note 3, at 1. 
49 See Bush, supra note 3, at 1. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 2. 
52 See id. at 3. 
53 See id. at 4–5; Matthew Murphy, China’s Anti-Monopoly Bureau Approves the Pfizer-Wyeth 
Transaction, Gerson Lehrman Group News, Sept. 29, 2009, http://www.glgroup.com/News/ 
Chinas-Anti-Monopoly-Bureau-Approves-the-Pfizer-Wyeth-Transaction-43739.html; MOC Sets Con- 
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been published, all but one was conditionally approved and all but that 
same decision involved a merger or acquisition of two non-Chinese 
corporations.54 The Coca-Cola merger has been the only decision to 
date in which MOFCOM has blocked an acquisition.55 
 In similar fashion to the prior publicly announced decisions, 
MOFCOM’s decision to block the Coca-Cola merger was announced in 
a “brief” notice on March 18, 2009.56 MOFCOM surprised some by ra-
tionalizing the decision to block the acquisition under the theory that 
Coca-Cola would leverage its brand dominance in the carbonated soft 
drink market to the fruit juice market, which would provide it the ability 
to eliminate or restrict competition, as discussed above.57 In addition, 
MOFCOM announced that it had afforded Coca-Cola an opportunity to 
propose solutions to reduce the negative impact to competition and that 
Coca-Cola had failed to do so.58 The MOFCOM notice included a mere 
five sentences of analysis regarding the concerns the acquisition would 
have created.59 
C. Horizontal Merger Review Under the United States Antitrust Regime 
 Merger review in the United States is, like the AML of China, a sta-
tutory byproduct.60 In 1976, the United States passed the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act, which provides for pre-merger notification to U.S. en-
forcement agencies, in particular, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
and the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division of 
the Department of Justice (DOJ).61 The various filing or notification 
requirements are similar in structure to those followed under the AML 
in that they also require filing or notification of a proposed acquisition 
or merger based either on the value of the transaction itself or the sales 
figures of either of the parties involved.62 Once notification has been 
provided to the appropriate enforcement agencies, those agencies will 
investigate the potential anticompetitive effects the merger or acquisi-
tion will likely have and will, within thirty days, request more informa-
                                                                                                                      
ditions on GM-Delphi Deal, Xinhua News Agency (P.R.C.), Sept. 29, 2009 [hereinafter GM-
Delphi], http://www.china.org.cn/business/2009-09/29/content_18624308. htm. 
54 See Bush, supra note 3, at 5–10; Murphy, supra note 53; GM-Delphi, supra note 53. 
55 See Bush, supra note 3, at 5–10. 
56 See id. at 8. 
57 See id. 
58 Id. at 9. 
59 Id. at 10. 
60 See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006); Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 2, arts. 20–31. 
61 See 15 U.S.C. § 18. 
62 See id. § 18a(a)(2). 
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tion or allow the transaction to move forward by simply allowing the 
thirty days to pass.63 
 The DOJ and FTC (Agency or Agencies) divide merger work by 
specializing in different industrial sectors.64 If, after the Agency has re-
quested additional information and has weighed the anticompetitive 
potential of a merger or acquisition, the decision is made to block a 
merger, the Agency must go to court to seek a preliminary injunction 
blocking the merger.65 A private litigant in the United States also has 
the ability to request an injunction to block a merger, though that liti-
gant will face the burden of discovery, and competitors in a particular 
industry will almost always lack standing to challenge the merger.66 In 
either case, a court will ultimately decide whether to block a merger if 
the merging parties challenge the Agency’s decision, and historically, 
the courts have given considerable deference to the Agency.67 Because 
of such deference, the Agency guidelines substantively determine 
whether a merger or acquisition will occur in the United States.68 
 DOJ Merger Guidelines set forth five steps that the Agency will 
take in assessing whether to approve or block a merger: assess (1) 
whether the merger would significantly increase concentration and re-
sult in a concentrated market, properly defined and measured; (2) 
whether the merger, in light of concentration in the market and other 
factors that characterize the market in question, raises concern about 
potential adverse competitive effects; (3) whether entry would be time-
ly, likely and sufficient either to deter or to counteract the competitive 
effects of concern; (4) whether there are any efficiency gains that can-
not otherwise be achieved other than through a merger; and (5) 
whether, but for the merger, either party would be likely to fail and exit 
the market.69 
 As market definition is a key component in merger review analysis, 
the Agencies tasked with merger review have developed guidelines that 
contain specific methodology for defining a relevant market and the 
use of concentration indices to determine when a proposed merger will 
                                                                                                                      
63 See id. § 18a(b)(B). 
64 Einer Elhauge, United States Antitrust Law and Economics 572–73 (Robert 
C. Clark et al. eds., 2008). 
65 Id. at 573. 
66 Id. 
67 See id. at 574. 
68 See id. 
69 U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines 3 
(1997) [hereinafter Merger Guidelines], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/ 
guidelines/hmg.pdf. 
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raise antitrust concerns.70 To define a relevant market, the Agency will 
focus on potential consumer responses.71 A market is defined as a 
product or group of products and a geographical area in which a hypo-
thetical profit-maximizing producer or seller of the given product 
would impose at least a “small but significant and nontransitory in-
crease in price” (SSNIP test).72 The relevant market for merger review 
purposes is the group of products and a geographic area that is no big-
ger than necessary to satisfy the SSNIP test.73 The SSNIP test gauges the 
likely reaction of buyers of a product to a price increase, generally 5% 
for Agency purposes.74 If buyers would shift to an alternative product in 
a market after a price increase and a hypothetical monopolist in that 
product market could not profitably sustain that price increase, the 
Agency will broaden the market to include the next-best substitute.75 
This process continues until a market is defined that is broad enough 
that buyer substitution would not prevent a hypothetical monopolist 
from sustaining a 5% increase.76 
 Once the relevant market has been defined, an assessment of the 
number of firms in that market and their respective market shares are 
established to determine market concentration.77 The Agency employs 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to determine market concen-
tration, calculated by determining the sum of the squares of the indi-
vidual market shares of all participants in a particular market, both pre- 
and post-merger.78 Based on how much that number will change post-
merger, the Agency determines if the market will become significantly 
more concentrated by the merger with an assumption that the more 
concentrated a market, the more likely a firm could exercise market 
power and therefore have a negative impact on competition.79 The 
Agency will also consider whether the merging firms produce differen-
                                                                                                                      
70 See ABA Antitrust Section, Monograph No. 7, Merger Standards Under U.S. 
Antitrust Laws 68–69 (1981) [hereinafter Monograph No. 7]; David Harbord & Tom 
Hoehn, Barriers to Entry and Exit in European Competition Policy, 14 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 
411, 412 n.2 (1994). 
71 See generally Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law 147–58 (2d ed. 2001) (discussing 
how elasticity of demand from consumers is directly related to how a market is defined for 
antitrust purposes). 
72 Merger Guidelines, supra note 69, at 4. 
73 Id. 
74 Elhauge, supra note 64, at 207–08. 
75 Id. at 208. 
76 Id. 
77 Elhauge, supra note 64, at 578–79; see Merger Guidelines, supra note 69, at 15–16. 
78 Elhauge, supra note 64, at 579; see Merger Guidelines, supra note 69, at 15–16. 
79 Elhauge, supra note 64, at 580; see Merger Guidelines, supra note 69, at 15–16. 
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tiated products or whether the competitors are close substitutes for one 
another in the eyes of consumers.80 If the Agency concludes that merg-
ing firms have a combined market share of at least 35%, that the prod-
ucts are regarded by purchasers to be close substitutes for one another, 
and that no alternative competitors are able to step in and compete, 
the Agency is more likely to block a merger for potential adverse effects 
to competition.81 
III. Analysis 
 United States jurisprudence concerning antitrust law has held, 
time and again, that the Sherman Act and subsequent antitrust legisla-
tion reflects a judgment by Congress that faith in competition lies at the 
center of national economic policy in the United States.82 Much like 
the AML, the statutory language of the Sherman and Clayton Acts is 
opaque, using phrasing such as “substantially to lessen competition” or 
“monopolize”; as a result, courts and antitrust enforcement agencies 
have been left to interpret those phrases and to determine when to in-
tervene if competition is threatened.83 Legislative deference to compe-
tition has operated on the assumption that all elements of a bargain in 
a free market—whether quality, service, safety, or durability—are fa-
vorably affected by competition, and thus, restraints on competition 
should be prohibited.84 Restraints on competition are anathema to the 
Congressional intent and economic principles underlying American 
antitrust law.85 The promotion of social goals through U.S. antitrust law 
has been absent in merger review analysis, as Agencies and courts have 
generally given deferred to Congressional concern with protecting 
“competition, not competitors.”86 
 Due to vague language in relevant antitrust statutes and what ap-
peared to be an inability of courts to consistently apply economic prin-
ciples involved in determining what activities might lessen competition, 
the DOJ began to establish guidelines in 1968 with the hope of insuring 
“that the business community, the legal profession, and other inter-
ested persons [were] informed of the Department’s policy” in enforc-
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81 Id. at 582. 
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ing the law.87 When standards of conduct applied to a market system 
are ambiguous or unclear, the danger of political or business-related 
interference in competition becomes a real possibility.88 Thus, while the 
AML purports to protect consumer welfare by protecting competition, 
China’s adoption of guidelines that focus squarely on competition is-
sues and leave other social goals to other areas of the law will better 
protect competition and benefit consumers in China, as well as provide 
market participants an adequate understanding of how to compete 
successfully, and legally, in China.89 
A. Protectionist Components Underlying the Coca-Cola Decision 
 Understanding why the decision to block Coca-Cola’s acquisition 
of Huiyuan may have been influenced by underlying protectionist con-
siderations involves understanding what other policy goals beyond pro-
tecting competition influence competition authorities.90 Stability and a 
“harmonious society” are seen as primary goals for the Chinese gov-
ernment, which is attempting to unify a formerly segmented economy 
and rectify a severe socioeconomic divide between its urban and rural 
populations.91 That such concerns would find themselves reflected in 
government attitudes towards competition is not surprising and that 
such concerns might influence MOFCOM’s enforcement of competi-
tion rules is equally unsurprising.92 
 Compound these policy concerns with the pervasive problem of 
local or regional administrative monopolies over segmented industries 
throughout China, and MOFCOM’s difficulty with focusing solely on 
competition becomes apparent.93 Simply put, Chinese officials have an 
acute awareness of how China trails international counterparts in being 
able to compete globally in certain industries and while foreign acquisi-
tions bring technical expertise and other efficiencies Chinese industry 
lacks, Chinese leaders also want to protect key industries against foreign 
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competition.94 As the growth potential in the fruit juice industry is im-
mense, it makes some sense that China might regard the fruit juice in-
dustry as a key industry in need of protection from domination by 
global competitors such as Coca-Cola.95 
 Huiyuan itself is not a product of the segmented fruit juice industry 
inside China, where local enterprises supply fruit juice beverages to vari-
ous geographic regions under the vestiges of the pre-1978 economy.96 By 
the end of 2008, the Chinese fruit juice industry was teeming with more 
than 300 medium and small fruit juice enterprises.97 The loss of Huiyuan 
to Coca-Cola would have removed one of the only large, domestically-
controlled fruit juice enterprises from the market, leaving China with 
hundreds of small and medium enterprises to compete against Coca-
Cola and other international competitors.98 The reality that Huiyuan 
would become controlled by Coca-Cola and that China would lose a 
highly successful brand that had been able to compete against global be-
verage giants provides reasonable concern that China was protecting an 
important domestic brand rather than truly focusing on the effects the 
Coca-Cola merger might have had on competition in the fruit juice in-
dustry.99 In its decision to block the merger, MOFCOM did not voice any 
such concerns, but in fact, soundly rejected the idea that Huiyuan’s sta-
tus as a national brand was a factor in its analysis at all.100 Beyond that 
proclamation, information regarding the analysis conducted and the 
findings used to make its decision are notably sparse.101 
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B. Competitive Components Underlying the Coca-Cola Decision 
 Could MOFCOM’s decision to block Coca-Cola’s acquisition of 
Huiyuan have been based solely on anticompetitive concerns, as the 
Chinese government has argued? The absence of guidelines on how 
horizontal mergers are reviewed by MOFCOM leave it up to conjecture 
as to how China determined the relevant market or the impact the 
merger might have on the concentration of that market, two factors 
critical to understanding whether a proposed merger is likely to have 
anticompetitive effects.102 
 Statements released after the decision indicate that China pro-
posed a theory that Coca-Cola would use its dominance in the carbon-
ated drink market to promote sales of Huiyuan, which would hamper 
competition and drive up prices in the fruit juice market.103 This “lev-
eraging” theory has found very little support in other global markets, 
such as the United States.104 China expressed fear that Coca-Cola would 
bundle its carbonated beverages with its fruit juice brands (including 
Huiyuan, post-merger), though ministry officials did not point to any 
direct evidence to show that Coca-Cola had engaged in such conduct, 
either with its Minute Maid brand or another product in China.105 
When faced with concerns regarding bundling in the United States, 
Agencies will determine the market power of the various parties and 
the concentration that exists in the relevant market to understand the 
potential anticompetitive effects bundling might have on the market, 
weighing those effects against potential efficiencies that might result to 
determine whether to bring action against a party.106 Bundling, even 
when it occurs, is not deemed per se illegal.107 
 MOFCOM argued that post-merger, Coca-Cola would have strong-
er market power in the fruit juice beverage market, as it would then 
control Huiyuan and its own Minute Maid brand, and “‘given its cur-
rent dominance over the carbonated beverage market and the carry-
over effect, the concentration will considerably raise barriers for poten-
tial competitors to enter the fruit juice beverage market.’”108 The acqui-
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sition, MOFCOM believes, would squeeze out small and medium-sized 
domestic fruit juice enterprises, negatively affecting competition and 
the “‘sustained and sound development of the Chinese fruit juice in-
dustry.’”109 Though Coca-Cola attempted to ameliorate these concerns 
through unpublicized proposals seeking to address specific issues dis-
closed by the Chinese government, MOFCOM ultimately rejected the 
proposed merger, and to date, no further information has been given 
as to the analysis conducted behind the scenes.110 
 While MOFCOM’s stated reasoning for blocking the merger falls 
near the boundaries of international antitrust practices, absent any 
knowledge of how the relevant market and pre- and post-merger con-
centration of that market was determined, it is difficult to know what 
the actual impact would have been on the fruit juice industry and on 
consumers in China had the merger been approved.111 Considering the 
growth potential in the fruit juice industry in China, it should not have 
been surprising that players in the market would consider acquisitions 
to expand their market share.112 Rarely would such mergers be pre-
vented in circumstances where the relevant market is undersupplied, as 
it would be unlikely that any one player could tacitly collude to drive up 
prices with other market participants absent a highly concentrated 
market.113 Could Coca-Cola have been able to maintain supracompeti-
tive pricing for its juice brands in light of the fact the fruit juice market 
in China has hundreds of participants who could potentially expand 
production and output in order to compete with Coca-Cola and cap-
ture unmet demand for fruit juice?114 With hundreds of potential com-
petitors domestically alone, MOFCOM must have been making an as-
sumption that the barriers to entry or expansion of these firms are high 
(not even considering potential entry by other international competi-
tors), though it is uncertain whether there was any actual analysis done 
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to support this assumption.115 Certainly none was provided in the deci-
sion.116 If barriers to entry or expansion are low, Coca-Cola would have 
been unable to charge supracompetitive prices.117 
 Absent guidelines as to how China might have determined the re-
levant market, how concentrated the market was pre- and post-merger 
or the barriers to entry or expansion in the market, Coca-Cola had no 
expectation of how its acquisition of Huiyuan would be analyzed by 
MOFCOM or what factors would determine the fate of the transac-
tion.118 This lesson came with likely high transaction costs and ulti-
mately, no return on investment for Coca-Cola.119 
Conclusion 
 It is not surprising that the first decision by China under the AML 
to block a proposed merger would draw some attention, and likely 
some criticism. The fact that the first instance of China flexing its anti-
trust enforcement muscles came at the expense of such a globally rec-
ognized brand as Coca-Cola was certain to attract the international 
business community’s attention. For decades China has been seen as 
the land of opportunity and growth for foreign investors and only time 
will determine whether this decision signals a change in that policy. 
China would have us believe that this decision rested solely on China’s 
commitment to protecting competition. To protect itself from accusa-
tions of economic nationalism or protectionism in the future, China 
should embrace the U.S. approach to merger review, issuing clear 
guidelines for enforcement agencies to follow and increasing transpar-
ency in its decision-making so that future enterprises can better plan 
and continue to see China as a fertile ground for growth and expan-
sion. Until then, global enterprises will hesitate investing the time and 
financial resources into Chinese expansion out of fear that they will be 
met with resistance sparked by non-competition-related concerns. 
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